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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Removal of sperm from a man’s body after death was first reported in 1980, in a 
case involving a 30-year-old man who died following a motor vehicle accident and 
whose family requested that his sperm be extracted and frozen.2  Since that time, 
more than ninety cases have been reported in which family members requested 
sperm retrieval from men who died3 or entered a persistent vegetative state4 (PVS), 
for the purpose of artificially inseminating a wife, girlfriend, or other woman.5  
Several medical techniques for retrieving sperm have been described.6  In at least one 
case, such retrieval and insemination resulted in pregnancy and childbirth.7  Media 
coverage of this birth has raised public awareness of such sperm retrieval, and 
additional requests for it in the future seem likely.  Although sperm retrieval could be 
performed for nonprocreative purposes, such as medical research, this paper focuses 
on cases in which the intent is procreative. 
                                                                
2Cappy Miles Rothman, A Method for Obtaining Viable Sperm in the Postmortem State, 
34 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 512 (1980). 
3Dead individuals include those whose hearts irreversibly stop beating and those whose 
heartbeat is maintained by machines but are brain dead.  Brain death is defined as irreversible 
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.  UNIF. DETERMINATION 
OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12A U.L.A. 589 (1996).  When there is irreversible loss of  heartbeat, 
sperm retrieval must occur within 24 hours to obtain viable sperm.  See Susan M. Kerr et al., 
Postmortem Sperm Procurement, 157 J. UROLOGY 2154 (1997). 
4Dr. Fred Plum, who coined the term “persistent vegetative state” and is an expert on the 
subject, has described it as follows:  “‘Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning 
entirely in terms of its internal controls.  It maintains temperature.  It maintains heartbeat and 
pulmonary ventilation.  It maintains digestive activity.  It maintains reflex activity of muscles 
and nerves for low level conditioned responses.  But there is no behavioral evidence of either 
self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.’”  In re Jobes, 529 A. 2d 
434, 438 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
5Many of these cases are documented in Kerr, supra note 3.  See also Dana A. Ohl et al., 
Procreation after Death or Mental Incompetence:  Medical Advance or Technology Gone 
Awry?, 66 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 889 (1996); Kenneth V. Iserson, Sperm Donation from a 
Comatose, Dying Man, 7 CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 209 (1998); Richard Pozda, Sperm 
Collection in the Brain-Dead Patient, 15 DIMENSIONS CRIT. CARE NURSING 98 (1996). 
6One method involves surgical excision of the epididymis.  See Rothman, supra note 2.  
Another approach involves irrigation or aspiration of the vas deferens.  See Kerr, supra note 3, 
at 2154.  Yet another method involves rectal insertion of a probe to induce electroejaculation.  
See Murphy F. Townsend et al., Artificially Stimulated Ejaculation in the Brain Dead Patient:  
A Case Report, 47 UROLOGY 760 (1996). 
7Jane E. Allen, Woman Pregnant By Sperm From Corpse, Associated Press Online, 
REF5618 (July 15, 1998); Louinn Lota, Baby Born From Dead Father’s Sperm, Associated 
Press Online, REF5876 (Mar. 26, 1999). 
1999-2000] SPERM RETRIEVAL 245 
In these cases, death or PVS typically is caused by sudden illnesses, such as head 
trauma, rapidly-progressing infections, or asphyxiation.  Because the illnesses are 
unanticipated, a typical feature of these cases has been the absence of the man’s prior 
consent to sperm retrieval and artificial insemination.  Despite the lack of such 
consent, sperm has been extracted in a number of cases in which requests have been 
made.8  Thus, these situations raise a number of ethical issues:  Should procreation 
by means of sperm retrieval and artificial insemination after death or PVS be 
allowed?  If  so, is the man’s consent ethically required?  Should we value the 
freedom of wives or others to have sperm retrieved in these circumstances?  In 
addition, a number of legal issues arise:  What is the legal status of a man’s prior 
consent to sperm retrieval and insemination after death or PVS?  What is the legal 
status of consent by the spouse or other next of kin for such procedures?  Should the 
man’s consent to sperm retrieval and insemination after death or PVS be legally 
required? 
Although a number of additional legal questions can be raised, including issues 
of paternity and inheritance, this paper focuses on the legal issues pertaining to 
consent, as well as the ethical questions raised above, which need to be discussed in 
order to address adequately the legal consent issues.  The paper is organized as 
follows:  first, the current law of consent to sperm retrieval and insemination after 
death or PVS is discussed in order to identify gaps in the law—areas that the law 
does not address or concerning which it is unclear; second, ethical issues are 
discussed that are relevant to deciding what the law should be; and third, based on 
the analysis of ethical issues, legal approaches are proposed that attempt to fill the 
gaps identified. 
We shall see that the law of consent differs in some respects, depending on 
whether a patient is alive or dead.  Because patients in PVS are legally alive,9 it will 
be necessary to consider separately cases involving PVS and those involving death.  
Specifically, Part II examines the current legal status of consent to retrieval and 
insemination in cases involving patients in PVS.  Part III explores the current legal 
status of consent to retrieve sperm from dead patients.  Part IV discusses the current 
law of consent in regard to artificial insemination using the sperm of dead patients.  
Part V puts forward and defends views concerning several ethical questions, 
including the following:  Should sperm retrieval and insemination following death or 
PVS be permitted?  Is the man’s consent necessary?  Part VI sets forth proposed 
legal approaches to cases involving patients in PVS, and Part VII states proposed 
legal approaches for cases involving dead patients. 
II.  THE LEGAL STATUS OF CONSENT TO SPERM RETRIEVAL AND INSEMINATION IN 
CASES OF PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE 
An analysis of the current law of consent, as applied to sperm extraction and 
insemination in PVS cases, can be divided into three areas:  statutory law; the 
                                                                
8See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 2; Ohl, supra note 5; Lori B. Andrews, The Sperminator, 
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 28, 1999, at 62. 
9Patients in PVS have at least some brain stem activity.  See, e.g., The Multi-Society Task 
Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1499, 1500 (1994).  Thus, they do not meet the criterion for brain death, which requires 
irreversible cessation of functioning of the entire brain.  See supra note 3. 
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common law of consent to medical treatment; and the right to consent to (or refuse) 
medical treatment implied by the constitutional right to privacy. 
Two types of statutes might initially seem to be relevant to the consent situation 
in question:  laws that establish the legal validity of Living Wills; and laws that 
establish Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care (DPAHC).  These statutes 
establish two types of advance directives that enable patients to express their wishes 
concerning medical treatment in the event they become mentally incompetent to 
participate in decisions.  Living Wills allow patients to specify those life-sustaining 
medical procedures they would want provided and those they would want withheld, 
should they become terminally ill.10  A signed and valid living will constitutes 
evidence of a patient’s wishes, and it provides a legal basis for physicians to 
withhold or withdraw treatment in accordance with those wishes.  DPAHC enables 
patients to appoint persons legally authorized to make decisions for them concerning 
medical treatment when the patients become mentally incompetent.11  The consent to 
(or refusal of) medical treatment by such a surrogate is legally valid when given in 
accordance with statutes establishing DPAHC. 
However, the wording of these statutes restricts the range of situations in which 
they are applicable.  Living Will statutes usually are worded to apply specifically to 
decisions about life-preserving treatment.  For example, the Uniform Rights of the 
Terminally Ill Act, which is the model act for living wills, is restricted in this 
manner, as explained in the Act’s prefatory note: 
The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act authorizes an adult person to 
control decisions regarding administration of life-preserving treatment in 
the event the person is in a terminal condition and is unable to participate 
in medical treatment decisions.  As the preceding sentence indicates, the 
scope of the Act is narrow... It’s impact is limited to treatment that is 
merely life-prolonging... Beyond its narrow scope, the Act is not intended 
to affect any existing rights and responsibilities of persons to make 
medical treatment decisions.12 
Although DPAHC statutes usually are not restricted to decisions about life-
preserving treatment, typically they are limited to decisions about treatment and 
diagnostic procedures.13  For example, the person appointed to act on the patient’s 
behalf (the attorney-in-fact) might be authorized by statute to make health care 
decisions, where “health care” is defined in the statute as “any care, treatment, 
service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual’s physical or 
mental condition.”14  Removing sperm in order to inseminate the wife is not a 
                                                                
10UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987). 
11See, e.g., Sana Loue, Living Wills, Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Care, and 
HIV Infection, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 461 (1995); Alice Mead, Durable Powers of Attroney for 
Healthcare, 39 PRAC. LAW. 39 (1993).  DPAHC statutes also allow patients to specify 
procedures that they would want provided or withheld.  See Loue, at 468. 
12UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (Prefatory Note), 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987). 
13Loue, supra note 11, at 467.  Mead, supra note 11, at 40. 
14See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-201, 202 (1996).  See also UNIF. LAW 
COMMISSIONERS’ MODEL HEALTH-CARE CONSENT ACT §§ 1, 6, 9 pt. 1 U.L.A. 453 (1988). 
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diagnostic procedure, and it is not treatment for the man in PVS.  Because of their 
wording, Living Will and DPAHC statutes cannot reasonably be interpreted as 
applying to sperm retrieval or artificial insemination. 
It might be asked whether the more general Durable Power of Attorney (DPA) 
statutes could be used to create an authority to consent to sperm retrieval and 
insemination after PVS.  After all, courts have recognized DPA statutes as a device 
for appointing surrogate decision makers for health care.15  In reply, we should keep 
in mind a precept of the law of agency, according to which an agent cannot do what 
the principal is not authorized to do.16  A question that needs to be explored is 
whether a patient is authorized under current law to consent (in advance) to sperm 
retrieval and insemination after onset of PVS.  This will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
A.  Common Law of Informed Consent and Advance Directives 
In addition to advance directives that are given validity by statute, advance 
directives are recognized in common law.   These nonstatutory advance directives 
generally fall into two categories:  living wills executed by patients in states that lack 
living will statutes; and conversations between patients and others, in which patients 
express their wishes concerning future treatment.17  The basis of these nonstatutory 
directives is the common law doctrine of informed consent, which recognizes the 
right of mentally competent persons to decide what medical procedures will be 
performed upon their bodies.18  As stated by Justice Cardozo, “Every human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent 
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”19  Courts have recognized 
that a logical corollary of the right to informed consent is the right to refuse 
treatment.20  Moreover, courts have held that the onset of mental incompetence does 
not negate a person’s interest in refusing medical treatment.21  Thus, a number of 
courts have held that life-preserving medical treatment may be withheld or 
withdrawn from mentally incompetent patients when there is sufficient evidence, in 
the form of written or verbal statements by the patient when previously competent, 
                                                                
15In re Hilda M. Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987). 
163 AM.JUR.2D Agency § 71 (1986). 
17Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Living Wills:  Validity, Construction, and Effect, 49 
A.L.R.4TH 812, 813-16 (1986); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1985); Alan 
Meisel, Legal Myths About Terminating Life Support, 151 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1497, 1501 
(1991).  For an example of the former type of nonstatutory advance directive, see John F. 
Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984); for an example of 
the latter type, see In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987). 
18W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 189-192 
(5th ed. 1984). 
19Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
20See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1222. 
21In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1976); Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1229. 
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that such withholding is in accordance with the patient’s wishes.22  In light of these 
rulings, the American Medical Association has recommended that requests by 
competent patients not to receive life-prolonging treatment in the event they enter a 
terminal state be documented in the patient’s chart.23 
Although prior verbal or written statements by patients have provided the basis 
for medical decisions under the informed consent doctrine, one should note the 
limited range of factual situations in which courts have applied such advance 
directives.  Virtually all the cases have involved decisions about withholding or 
withdrawing life-prolonging treatment for patients who were terminally ill or in 
PVS.  No court has been asked to rule on whether advance directives are applicable 
to sperm retrieval or insemination for patients in PVS.  Whether courts should extend 
the doctrine of advance directives to cover sperm retrieval and insemination will be 
discussed later in this paper. 
B.  Common Law Authority of Next of Kin to Consent 
In the absence of a Living Will or DPAHC that is executed in compliance with 
applicable state statutes, common law holds that the next of kin has legal authority to 
consent to the providing or withholding of life-preserving medical treatment for 
mentally incompetent patients.24  However, decisions by the next of kin must follow 
certain principles, referred to as the “substituted judgment standard” and the “best 
interests standard”.  The substituted judgment standard  most clearly applies in cases 
involving patients who previously were mentally competent.  According to this 
standard, the next of kin should attempt to determine what course of medical 
treatment the patient, if competent, would choose.25  This implies that if the wishes 
of the previously competent patient are known, they should be followed.  If the 
patient’s wishes concerning provision of life-preserving treatment are unknown, then 
the best interests standard applies, according to which the next of kin should attempt 
to make the decision that best promotes the welfare of the patient.26 
In principle, it would be possible to use the substituted judgment standard to 
decide in favor of sperm retrieval and insemination, assuming the patient had 
previously expressed a desire to have these procedures performed.  If the patient has 
not expressed his wishes, then the question arises as to whether the best interests 
standard could provide a basis for sperm retrieval and insemination.  In such 
                                                                
22See e.g., In re Eichner 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981); Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209; In re Lydia 
E. Hall Hospital, 455 N.Y.S. 2d 706 (1982).  Exceptions to the rule of permitting treatment 
refusal are put forward in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 
2d  417, 425-27 (Mass. 1977). 
23COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE 
OF MEDICAL ETHICS:  CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS, § 2.22 at 67 (1998).  See also 
David Orentlicher, Advance Medical Directives, 263 JAMA 2365 (1990). 
24See, e.g., Sarno, supra note 17, at 815; Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1978), aff’’d 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Kennedy Hospital, 452 So.2d 921. 
25Sarno, supra note 17, at 815; Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209. 
26Lawrence W. Vernaglia, Annotation, Propriety of, and Liability Related to, Issuance or 
Enforcement of Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) Orders, 46 A.L.R.5TH 793, 804-5 (1997); Conroy, 
486 A.2d 1209. 
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circumstances, it would be difficult to argue that the patient’s best interests requires 
the carrying out of sperm extraction and insemination.  Because his wishes are 
unknown, there is no way to know whether such procedures would satisfy a desire he 
might have had.  Because he is permanently unconscious, he would never derive 
satisfaction or benefit from an awareness of such procedures being carried out.  
Thus, it is doubtful that the best interests standard could be used in this way. 
Although the substituted judgment standard could in principle be used, it should 
be pointed out that this standard has only been applied by courts in a limited range of 
situations.  Again, all the reported cases have focused on decisions about 
withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment for patients who were 
terminally ill or in PVS.  No court has ruled on whether the substituted judgment 
doctrine is applicable to sperm retrieval and insemination for patients in PVS.  
Whether courts should apply the substituted judgment standard in such cases will 
also be explored later in this paper. 
C.  Persistent Vegetative State and the Constitutional Right to Privacy 
The Supreme Court first articulated the right to privacy in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, which held that married couples have a constitutional right to use 
contraceptives.27  In Roe v. Wade, the Court extended the right to privacy to cover a 
woman’s decision to abort a pregnancy.28  Although these cases pertain to freedom to 
avoid procreation—through contraception and abortion—other Supreme Court cases 
indicate that there is a constitutionally protected interest in freedom to procreate.  In 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court declared an Oklahoma statute authorizing the 
sterilization of habitual criminals to be unconstitutional, stating that “we are dealing 
here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.  Marriage 
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”29  In 
Loving v. Virginia, the Court struck down Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages, 
holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entails a right to 
choose one’s spouse, thus rendering a decision that can be interpreted as protecting 
freedom to procreate.30  
In addition to cases involving procreation, cases involving withholding treatment 
have invoked the right to privacy.  In the case of In re Quinlan, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the right to privacy “is broad enough to encompass a 
patient’s decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances.”31  In 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the U.S. Supreme Court stated 
explicitly that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment.32  Some courts have based the right of incompetent 
patients to refuse treatment on both the common law doctrine of informed consent 
                                                                
27Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
28Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
29Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941). 
30Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
31Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663. 
32Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990) 
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and the constitutional right to privacy.33  The constitutional cases involving interests 
in procreation and in refusing medical treatment raise several questions:  Does the 
constitutionally protected freedom to procreate extend to procreation after an 
individual becomes irreversibly unconscious?  Does the constitutional interest of a 
patient in PVS to refuse medical treatment include an interest in refusing sperm 
retrieval? 
To summarize this part, Living Will and DPAHC statutes, as currently written, 
are not applicable to sperm retrieval and insemination after PVS.  It is unclear 
whether the common law doctrines of advance directives and substituted judgment 
should be extended to such cases.  Because it is unclear that the patient has legal 
authority to consent, it is unclear whether an attorney-in-fact appointed under a DPA 
statute would be authorized to consent.  Furthermore, because no statute or court has 
addressed these issues, it follows that no statute or court has held that the consent of 
the patient is legally required. 
III.  THE LEGAL STATUS OF CONSENT TO POSTMORTEM SPERM RETRIEVAL 
Discussion of the current law of consent, as applied to postmortem sperm 
removal and insemination, can be organized into these areas:  statutory law; common 
law concerning the disposition of dead bodies; and the constitutional right to privacy. 
The question arises whether any statutes are relevant to the validity of consent to 
postmortem sperm retrieval.  One might initially think that the Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act (UAGA) is relevant.  State laws modeled on the UAGA establish the 
validity of consent by the patient or next of kin to removal of organs and tissues after 
death.  However, the UAGA places restrictions on the purposes for which body parts 
can be removed.  Section 2(a) of the Act states that “An individual who is at least 
[18] years of age may . . . make an anatomical gift for any of the purposes stated in 
Section 6(a) . . .”34  Furthermore, according to Section 6(a): 
The following persons may become donees of anatomical gifts for the 
purposes stated: 
1) a hospital, physician, surgeon, or procurement organization, for 
transplantation, therapy, medical or dental education, research, or 
advancement of medical or dental science; 
2) an accredited medical or dental school, college, or university for 
education, research, advancement of medical or dental science; or 
3) a designated individual for transplantation or therapy needed by 
that individual.35 
Postmortem sperm retrieval and subsequent insemination do not appear to constitute 
transplantation or therapy, as those terms ordinarily are understood.  Moreover, the 
purpose of retrieval in the types of cases under consideration is not medical research 
                                                                
33Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 2d  417. 
34UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2, 8A U.L.A. 19, 33 (1993). 
35UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6 U.L.A. 53. 
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or education, but attempted procreation using the patient’s sperm.  Thus, it is 
doubtful that the UAGA in its current form can reasonably be construed as 
authorizing sperm retrieval for the purpose of impregnating the widow of the 
deceased. 
A.  Common Law on Disposition of Dead Bodies 
At common law, the next of kin has a right to make decisions concerning the 
disposition of dead bodies.36  However, this right is defined narrowly, based on the 
common law principle that there is no right of property, in a strict or commercial 
sense, in dead bodies.37  Courts have use the term “quasi-property rights” in 
describing the interests of the surviving spouse or next of kin in controlling what is 
done to the dead bodies of loved ones.38  The main purpose of this “quasi-property” 
right is not prevention of injury to the dead body itself, but prevention of improper 
actions to the body that would offend or cause emotional harm to surviving family 
members.39  The right in question has been described as a right to bury the body in 
the condition in which it was found when the decedent died.40  It consists of a right to 
make decisions concerning burial or cremation, including the time, place, and 
manner of interment.  In the absence of statutes that specify otherwise, this range of 
decisions constitutes the only right the next of kin has in a dead body.41  Examples of 
statutory rights of the next of kin to make decisions include the right to consent to 
organ removal for transplantation, in the absence of contrary indications by the 
deceased, and the right to consent to an autopsy.  In addition, even these limited 
rights of the next of kin to make decisions about the body can be overridden by court 
order or statute when required by the demands of justice or the public good.42  An 
example would be legislation authorizing an autopsy without the next of kin’s 
consent when death is caused by violence or an accident. 
It might be asked whether the decedent’s own wishes concerning disposition of 
his body is recognized under common law as authorizing such disposition.  
Discussion of this question can be divided into testamentary and nontestamentary 
expressions of the decedent’s wishes.  To begin, a number of cases have addressed 
this question where the decedent’s preferences were expressed orally or in writing 
other than a will.  Analysis of these cases indicates that “...it has always been 
extremely problematical whether a person’s attempted oral or nontestamentary 
                                                                
3625A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 3 at 491-93 (1966). 
3725A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 3 at 489. 
38See Thomas L. O’Carroll, Over My Dead Body:  Recognizing Property Rights in 
Corpses, 29 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 238 (1996).  See also Noralyn O. Harlow, Annotation, 
Statutes Authorizing Removal of Body Parts for Transplant:  Validity and Construction, 54 
A.L.R.4TH 1214, 1216 (1987). 
39O’Carroll, supra note 38, at 239.  See also Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising From the 
Dead:  Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 923-28 (1997). 
4022 AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 32 (1988); James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Liability for 
Wrongful Autopsy, 18 A.L.R.4TH 858, 862 (1982). 
4125A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2 at 490 (1966); O’Carroll, supra note 38, at 239. 
42See 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies §§ 2, 3. 
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written disposition of his body will be enforced.”43  Courts generally have held that 
the decedent’s wishes should be given consideration, but that the decision about 
whether to carry them out should be made in light of additional interests that might 
be relevant, which can include the wishes and feelings of the surviving spouse or 
other family members, as well as the interests of the public.  When the decedent’s 
preferences conflict with these other interests, courts generally decide which interests 
should have priority on a case-by-case basis, after examining the circumstances of 
the particular case.  In a number of cases, the decedent’s wishes have been 
overruled.44  When the decedent’s preferences are expressed in a will, there still is no 
guarantee that courts will uphold them.  Although courts have held that a person has 
a right to dispose of his own body by will, some courts have permitted the wishes of 
the surviving spouse or next of kin to prevail over the wishes of the deceased, 
reflecting the fact that there is not a strict property interest in dead bodies.45  Thus, 
this body of law does not create a requirement of consent by the deceased, nor does it 
establish the decedant’s prior wishes as determinative. 
B.  Dead Bodies and the Constitutional Right to Privacy 
The advent of postmortem sperm retrieval and insemination raises a number of 
questions concerning how far the right to privacy extends:  Does the constitutionally 
protected freedom to procreate extend to posthumous procreation?  If so, could a 
legal justification for honoring a man’s prior request for postmortem sperm retrieval 
be based on this constitutional protection?  Similarly, does the constitutionally 
protected freedom not to procreate include freedom to refuse postmortem sperm 
retrieval?  To date, these specific constitutional questions have not been addressed by 
the courts. 
To summarize, the law at present does not authorize the next of kin to consent to 
postmortem sperm retrieval or insemination.  Moreover, the law does not clearly 
grant validity to the patient’s prior consent to these procedures.  In addition, because 
no statute or court has addressed these issues, it follows that no statute or court has 
held that the consent of the patient is legally required for the performance of these 
procedures. 
IV.  THE LEGAL STATUS OF CONSENT TO POSTMORTEM USE OF SPERM FOR 
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
Currently there are no statutes that establish the validity of consent to use a man’s 
sperm for artificial insemination after he dies.  Although the Uniform Parentage Act 
sets forth legal rules concerning the paternity of children conceived posthumously, it 
does not address consent to the medical procedure of artificial insemination.46  
                                                                
43Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Enforcement of Preference Expressed by Decedent as to 
Disposition of His Body After Death, 54 A.L.R.3D 1037, 1040 (1973). 
44Wagner, supra note 43, at 1040-41, 1057, 1063, 1066. 
45B. C. Ricketts, Annotation, Validity and Effect of Testamentary Direction as to 
Disposition of Testator’s Body, 7 A.L.R.3D 747, 749 (1966). 
46UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987).  See also John A. Gibbons, Who’s Your 
Daddy?:  A Constitutional Analysis of Post-Mortem Insemination, 14 J. COMTEMP. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 187, 206 (1997). 
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Moreover, the UAGA, as discussed above, authorizes anatomical gifts only for the 
purposes of transplantation, therapy, education, and research.47  Thus, it does not 
confer validity to consent by the man or next of kin to use sperm for the purpose of 
procreation. 
To date, there is only one court decision in the United States that has potential 
relevance to the question of consent to postmortem use of sperm for artificial 
insemination.  That case, Hecht v. Superior Court, involved a bequest of frozen 
sperm by William Kane to his girlfriend Deborah Hecht.48  Kane had deposited 15 
vials of his sperm in a sperm bank and signed a storage agreement specifying that in 
the event of his death the sperm bank should release the vials to Deborah Hecht.  
Kane also executed a will in which he bequeathed the sperm and most of his estate to 
Hecht, and in which he expressed the intention that the sperm be available for the 
insemination of Hecht, should she so desire.  Subsequently Kane committed suicide, 
and he was survived by two college-age children of his former wife, whom he had 
divorced years before.  The children contested the will, including the bequest of 
sperm to Hecht, in an attempt to prevent the birth of future half-siblings. 
At one point in the ensuing legal proceedings, the appellate court overturned the 
trial court’s order that the children’s request to have the sperm destroyed be carried 
out.  In its decision, the appeals court held that Kane had an interest in controlling 
the use of his sperm for reproduction.  Specifically, the court wrote, “We conclude 
that at the time of his death, decedent had an interest, in the nature of ownership, to 
the extent that he had decisionmaking authority as to the use of his sperm for 
reproduction.”49  The Hecht court also discussed, with approval, the decision of a 
French court to allow the sperm of a dead man to be used by his wife for 
insemination, based on evidence that the man wanted the insemination to occur.50  It 
should be noted that the Hecht court did not explicitly state that the decedent’s 
previously stated wishes constituted legally valid consent.  However, its comments 
imply approval of the view that the insemination of Hecht should be legally 
permissible.  Its decision arguably could provide a precedent that would permit 
insemination based on the deceased person’s wishes. 
Postmortem use of sperm for artificial insemination raises additional questions 
for the right to privacy:  Could a legal justification for carrying out a man’s prior 
request for postmortem artificial insemination be grounded on the right to privacy?  
Could a justification for honoring a man’s previous refusal of postmortem 
insemination rest on the right to privacy?  These constitutional questions have not yet 
been addressed by the courts. 
In summary, the law at present does not clearly confer validity on the consent of 
the patient or next of kin for insemination following death.  However, one could 
                                                                
47Supra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
48Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (1993). See also Janet J. Berry, Life After 
Death:  Preservation of the Immortal Seed, 72 TUL. L. REV. 231, 239-41 (1997); Andrea 
Corvalán, Fatherhood After Death:  A Legal and Ethical Analysis of Posthumous 
Reproduction, 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 335, 344-47 (1997). 
49Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 850. 
50For a discussion of this case, which involved Alain and Corinne Parpalaix, see id. at 855-
57.  See also E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm:  The 
Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 229-233 (1986-87). 
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argue for the validity of patient consent, based on the Hecht decision, provided the 
patient’s wishes had been clearly expressed.  Also, no statute or court, including the 
Hecht court, has stated that the man’s consent is legally required for postmortem 
artificial insemination. 
V. SHOULD SPERM RETRIEVAL AND INSEMINATION BE PERMITTED IN THESE CASES? 
As the above discussion indicates, under current law in the United States no one 
has clear legal authority to consent to sperm retrieval or insemination after death or 
PVS, including the patient and the patient’s next of kin.  Moreover, there is no 
existing legal requirement that the patient’s consent be obtained prior to such 
procedures.  This lacuna in the law needs to be addressed, and it raises the question 
of what the law should say about these matters.  Should such retrieval and 
insemination be legally permitted?  If so, who should have legal authority to give 
consent, and under what circumstances? 
Our answers to these legal questions should be based on our answers to certain 
underlying ethical questions:  Is procreation following death or PVS something that 
should be valued?  Should sperm retrieval and insemination in these cases be 
permitted?  Is it ethical to retrieve sperm from patients who are dead or in PVS but 
have not given prior consent?  This section puts forward and attempts to defend 
answers to these ethical questions, in order to provide a basis for discussing in the 
following sections what the law should be. 
A.  Should We Value Freedom to Procreate (or Not Procreate) After Death or PVS? 
To explore whether freedom to procreate after death or PVS should be valued, let 
us begin with situations in which the patient has given explicit prior consent to sperm 
retrieval and subsequent insemination of his wife.  Let us also assume that the wife 
agrees to the carrying out of these procedures.  The term “explicit prior consent” is 
used here to refer to verbal or written consent that the man gives directly to health 
care professionals.  Although no cases to date have involved such explicit consent, 
one can imagine a scenario in which a patient discusses such matters in advance with 
his physician.  It is useful to begin with this type of situation, in which the physician 
has direct knowledge of the patient’s wishes; later we shall consider situations in 
which there is absence of explicit prior consent, as well as situations involving a 
girlfriend rather than a wife. 
To consider whether individuals should have freedom to procreate after death or 
PVS, it is necessary to ask whether procreation in this type of scenario is something 
that individuals can reasonably value.  One approach to answering the latter question 
is to begin by asking why procreation is important to individuals in more ordinary 
contexts.  Here, “ordinary” refers to the more common form of procreation in which 
a couple conceives by sexual intercourse and then raises the child who is born.  The 
strategy being employed is to try to understand why procreation is meaningful to 
individuals in the ordinary scenario, and then consider whether any of the identified 
reasons also apply when the patient has died or entered PVS.  If some of them apply, 
they would lend support to permitting attempted procreation after death or PVS, in at 
least some cases. 
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Research has identified a number of reasons people actually give for wanting to 
procreate.51  However, some of the reasons that have been given seem confused or 
selfish.  For example, some have said that they desire to procreate in order to save a 
troubled marriage.  This reason can be criticized because it fails to deal with the 
cause of the marital problems, and the stresses of raising the child could further 
strain the marital relationship.  Another example involves people who say they want 
to have genetic offspring in order to demonstrate their femininity or virility.  This 
type of reason seems to be based on the view that women must have babies in order 
to prove their femininity and that virility is central to the worth of a man.  It can be 
criticized for stereotyping sex roles and overlooking ways of enhancing self-esteem 
other than having children.  Some authors have suggested that the desire to procreate 
is always unreasonable, as in these examples.52  Rather than accept this 
pronouncement, we should consider whether there are defensible reasons people can 
give for wanting to procreate. 
At least six reasons have been identified that persons could give to support the 
reasonableness of their desire to have genetic offspring.  These are reasons that 
individuals could put forward in explaining why procreation is meaningful and 
important to them:  (1) procreation involves participation in the creation of a person; 
(2) it can be an affirmation of mutual love; (3) it can contribute to sexual intimacy; 
(4) it can provide a link to future persons; (5) it can involve experiences associated 
with pregnancy and childbirth; and (6) it can involve experiences of child rearing.53  
This is not meant to imply that persons ought to have these reasons, or even that 
persons ought to desire to procreate, but only that the desire to procreate can be 
defended by appealing to such reasons. 
These reasons suggest that having genetic offspring can be valuable to a person, 
in part, because it can contribute to one’s self-identity.  For example, participating in 
the creation of a person can become part of one’s self-identity.  Similarly, whether 
one has gestated, reared, or obtained a certain type of link to the future can be part of 
one’s sense of who one is.  These reasons also suggest that procreation can, in some 
cases, contribute to self-fulfillment, for it can result in marital love being enriched 
and marital intimacy being deepened.54  These considerations help explain why 
freedom to procreate in the ordinary context should be valued; namely because 
procreation can be important to persons in the ways identified, including contributing 
to self-identity and self-fulfillment. 
There are other reasons why freedom not to procreate is valuable to persons.  
First, it is valuable because it is important for directing the course of one’s life.  
Gestating and raising children is a large undertaking that can compete with other 
                                                                
51See, e.g., Jean E. Veevers, The Social Meanings of Parentlhood, 36 PSYCHIATRY 291 
(1973); Edward Pohlman, Motivations in Wanting Conceptions, in PRONATALISM 159 (Ellen 
Peck & Judith Senderowitz eds., 1974); FRED ARNOLD ET AL., THE VALUE OF CHILDREN:  A 
CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY (1975); EULAH CROSON LAUCKS, THE MEANING OF CHILDREN:  
ATTIDUDES AND OPINIONS OF A SELECTED GROUP OF U.S. UNIVERSITY GRADUATES (1981). 
52See e.g., Axel Kahn, Clone Mammals...Clone Man? 386 NATURE 119 (1997). 
53CARSON STRONG, ETHICS IN REPRODUCTIVE AND PERINATAL MEDICINE:  A NEW 
FRAMEWORK 18-22 (1997). 
54For additional discussion of these six reasons and their implications for self-identity and 
self-fulfillment, see Id. ch. 1. 
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projects and goals in one’s life by placing demands on one’s time, energy, and 
resources.  Thus, in the ordinary context, self-determination in making major life 
choices is promoted by freedom to choose whether to have children (or, for those 
who already have children, to choose whether to have additional children).55  Second, 
being able to affect the circumstances in which one’s children are raised might be 
important to some.  Freedom not to procreate permits some to avoid rearing 
circumstances they consider undesirable, perhaps to postpone procreation until 
circumstances they regard as more favorable occur. 
Now let us consider whether these reasons for valuing procreative freedom are 
applicable to sperm retrieval and insemination after death or PVS.  A man’s 
previously stated wishes might be either that his sperm be used or that it not be used 
for procreative purposes after dying or entering PVS.  Let us begin with the scenario 
in which the man stated that he would want his sperm to be used.  Although some of 
the reasons for valuing freedom to procreate identified above do not apply to this 
situation, it appears that the following reasons can be applicable. 
First, such retrieval and insemination could involve participating in the creation 
of a person.  Such participation can be meaningful to individuals for a number of 
reasons.  For some, the idea of bringing into being an individual who develops self-
consciousness might be important.  For others, the significance of participation in the 
creation of a person might be religious; some might regard it as acting as an 
instrument of God’s will, while others might see it as fulfillment of a religious duty.  
Perhaps not everyone who has children thinks about it in terms of creating a person, 
but this is a reason that can be given to justify the desire to procreate.  Furthermore, 
it is reasonable to say that a man can participate in the creation of a person even 
though the insemination occurs after he has died or entered PVS.  After all, the man 
can take actions while he is mentally competent that will cause the insemination to 
occur, and it is his sperm that would be used.  Admittedly, the man would never 
know whether the attempt to create a person would be successful.  Nevertheless, the 
plan to create a person and the hope that the plan succeeds could be meaningful to an 
individual and could contribute to self-identity. 
Second, intentionally having offspring can be an affirmation of a couple’s mutual 
love and acceptance of each other.  It can be a deep expression of  acceptance to say 
to another, in effect, “I want your genes to contribute to the genetic makeup of my 
children.”  Similarly, a plan to procreate even if one member of a couple dies or 
enters PVS could be an affirmation of mutual love and acceptance.  There have been 
cases in which procreation after the death of one member of the couple has been 
planned and has had this sort of special meaning for the couple.56  There is no reason 
why similar considerations and feelings could not occur in a case involving PVS.  
This affirmation and its personal meaning to the couple can be strong even though 
they know that, in the circumstances envisioned, one member of the couple would be 
“gone”. 
                                                                
55See David A. J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy:  A 
Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 1000 
(1979). 
56This appears to have been a feature of the Parpalaix case, which is discussed in Hecht, 
16 Cal. App 4th at 850; Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 50, at 229-33. 
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Third, procreation can be valued by some because it provides a link to future 
persons.  There might be several ways in which such a link could have personal 
meaning.  Some might consider it important to have a family line that continues.  
Others might find it significant to play a role in the continuation of humanity.  Such a 
link to the future can be created even though conception occurs after one dies or 
enters PVS.  Although the man would never know whether the link actually 
occurred, a plan to create it could have personal significance and contribute to self-
identity. 
Thus, persons can give significant reasons for valuing procreation after death or 
PVS.  Because such reasons can be given, freedom to attempt procreation in such 
circumstances deserves at least some degree of respect.  Admittedly, plans to 
procreate after death or PVS might not play as central a role in a person’s life as does 
procreation in the ordinary scenario.  In the ordinary context, where one becomes a 
rearing parent, procreating usually has a greater impact on one’s life plans, as well as 
on one’s self-fulfillment and self-identity.  For this reason, the argument for 
respecting freedom to procreate in the ordinary scenario is stronger than the 
argument for respecting freedom to procreate after death or PVS.  Even so, decisions 
to attempt procreation after death or PVS can be meaningful to some persons for the 
reasons discussed, and this gives the argument for respecting such decisions at least 
some degree of strength. 
This view disagrees with the idea, expressed by John Robertson, that freedom to 
procreate after death has little importance.  Robertson points out that experiences 
associated with procreation after death would be an attenuated version of the 
experiences involved in procreating during one’s lifetime.  He further states, 
“Indeed, it is so attenuated that one could argue it is not an important reproductive 
experience at all…”57  In reply, if procreation were meaningful to individuals only 
because it involves experiences associated with gestating and rearing children, then it 
would be true that procreation after death or PVS can have little importance.  
However, in exploring why procreation is meaningful to persons, we have seen that 
other reasons matter as well.  When account is taken of desires to participate in the 
creation of a person, to affirm mutual love, and to have a link to the future, it is 
possible to understand that some plans to procreate after death or PVS can be 
important to individuals.  A middle ground seems reasonable, between the extremes 
of saying that such plans have no importance and saying that they are equal in 
importance to procreation in the ordinary context. 
A second possibility is that a man would state a wish not to procreate after death 
or PVS.  Although some of the main reasons for valuing freedom not to procreate in 
the ordinary context do not apply to procreation after death or PVS, at least one can; 
namely, the desire to avoid bringing a child into being in circumstances the person 
considers undesirable for rearing.  Some men might be opposed to creating a child 
when they would be unable to participate in rearing.  It should be acknowledged that 
freedom not to procreate after death or PVS has less impact on one’s life than 
freedom not to procreate during one’s lifetime.  Thus, the argument for respecting 
                                                                
57John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1032 (1994).  Prof. 
Robertson’s view appears to be accepted by Sheri Gilbert, Fatherhood From the Grave:  An 
Analysis of Postmortem Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 551-54 (1993).  See also John 
A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, in FERTILITY AND REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 255 (R. 
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freedom not to procreate when alive is stronger than the argument for respecting 
freedom not to procreate after death or PVS.  Nevertheless, avoiding procreation 
after death or PVS can be important to some persons, and this gives the argument for 
respecting those decisions some degree of strength. 
B.  Argument for Sometimes Permitting Sperm Retrieval and Insemination After 
Death or Persistent Vegetative State 
Drawing on the above discussion, it is possible to put forward an argument for 
permitting sperm retrieval and insemination after death or PVS, in at least some 
cases.  Again we assume, for sake of argument, that the man has given explicit prior 
consent to health care professionals for extracting his sperm and using it to 
artificially inseminate his wife.  Let us also assume that the wife wants to have the 
sperm removed and to be inseminated.  At least two main ethical considerations 
support permitting these procedures in this type of situation.  First, performing these 
procedures would promote the man’s freedom to make decisions when alive and 
competent concerning procreation after death or PVS.  As discussed above, it is 
possible to have good reasons for wanting to procreate after death or PVS.  The fact 
that good reasons are possible gives us a rationale for respecting freedom to 
procreate after death or PVS.  Although the reasons are not as strong as the reasons 
for respecting freedom to procreate when the person is alive and conscious, they 
carry at least some degree of weight and provide a reason for respecting the man’s 
wishes.  Second, given that the wife also requests the retrieval and insemination, 
carrying out these procedures promotes her freedom to procreate.  A number of 
reasons for valuing procreation in the ordinary scenario could apply to her, including 
the following:  the procreation in question could permit her to participate in the 
creation of a person; it could give her a way to affirm her love for her husband; it 
could provide a link to future persons that might be meaningful to her; and it could 
enable her to experience pregnancy, childbirth, and child rearing.  If procreation in 
the ordinary context is valuable in part because it can be meaningful to persons in 
these ways, then it seems that the woman’s procreation using sperm retrieved after 
death or PVS could be valuable to her for the same reasons.  Moreover, the 
qualification made above, that the argument for respecting procreation after death or 
PVS is weaker than the argument for respecting procreation when alive and 
conscious, is not applicable.  For the woman, the procreation in question would 
occur during a time when she is alive and conscious.  Because so many of the 
reasons that can be given in the ordinary scenario are applicable, her procreative 
freedom should be regarded as having a degree of importance close to, if not the 
same as, that of procreative freedom in the ordinary context. 
C.  When the Man’s Wishes Can Reasonably Be Inferred 
The above discussion assumes that the man gave explicit written or verbal 
consent to health care providers.  Now let us suppose that consent was not given 
directly to health care providers, but that there is sufficient evidence to justify a 
conclusion that he would have wanted to have sperm removed and his wife 
inseminated.  Evidence that is satisfactory in this context might include prior 
statements made by the man to family members or friends that expressed his wishes 
concerning sperm retrieval after death or PVS, or it might consist of a prior written 
1999-2000] SPERM RETRIEVAL 259 
statement prepared when he was mentally competent and witnessed by others.58  Let 
us also assume, as before, that the wife wants sperm removed and to be artificially 
inseminated.  The question arises as to whether sperm retrieval and insemination 
should also be permitted in this type of situation.  It can be argued that the 
procedures should be permitted, based on the same ethical argument given above, 
and also on an analogy to discontinuing life-preserving treatment for patients in 
PVS. 
The ethical argument given above applies not only when there is explicit prior 
consent, but also when there is sufficient evidence to infer that the man would want 
retrieval and insemination.  We have seen that it is possible to have good reasons for 
wanting to procreate after death or PVS.  Acting in accordance with the man’s 
reasonably inferred wishes would respect his freedom to make decisions concerning 
procreation after death or PVS.  Assuming the wife also wants the retrieval and 
insemination, performing these procedures would respect her procreative freedom. 
This type of situation is analogous to those involving decisions about life-
preserving treatment for patients in PVS.  In particular, consider cases in which 
patients in PVS have not previously discussed withholding life-prolonging treatment 
with their physicians.  In such circumstances, it is ethically appropriate to ask 
families whether patients have a Living Will or had engaged in conversations in 
which they expressed their wishes about life-sustaining treatment. If there is 
sufficient evidence that the patient would want treatment withheld, then respect for 
those wishes would be a major part of the ethical justification for withholding it.  
Similar considerations would seem to apply when the decision is concerned not with 
life-prolonging treatment but with sperm retrieval and insemination.  Respect for the 
autonomy of the previously alive and mentally competent person is an important 
ethical consideration in both types of situations.  If there is sufficient evidence that 
the man would want sperm retrieval and insemination, then his freedom to procreate 
would be promoted by performing those procedures.  As before, the  wife’s freedom 
to procreate would be an important consideration, as well. 
Similarly, when the man is dead instead of in PVS, the same ethical arguments 
apply; respect for the autonomy of the previously alive and mentally competent 
person is ethically relevant, whether the man is now in PVS or dead. 
D.  Is the Man’s Explicit or Inferred Consent Necessary? 
An important question is whether the man’s consent to sperm retrieval and 
insemination, whether explicitly given or inferred from sufficient evidence, is 
ethically required.  This question arises in the common scenario in which the wife 
requests retrieval but there is a lack of sufficient evidence to infer either the man’s 
approval or disapproval.  It was argued above that the wife’s freedom to procreate in 
this type of scenario is comparable in strength to freedom to procreate in the ordinary 
scenario; and it was argued that freedom not to procreate after death or PVS is less 
important than freedom not to procreate in the ordinary context.  If one relied only 
on these considerations, one would conclude that the wife’s wishes should prevail.  
However, there is an opposing ethical argument that a person’s gametes, and 
embryos created with those gametes, should not be used for procreative purposes 
                                                                
58Because this is an ethical argument, no particular legal standard of evidence is being put 
forward.  The issue of what legal standard should be used will be discussed below. 
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without the person’s consent, whether explicitly given or inferred from sufficient 
evidence.  An example of a violation of this ethical precept is the well-known misuse 
of embryos at the infertility clinic of the University of California, Irvine.  Embryos 
were transferred to recipient infertile couples without the consent of the couples who 
were progenitors of the embryos, resulting in live births in some cases.59  The 
progenitor couples eventually learned about the transfers, and some experienced the 
anguish of knowing that their genetic children were born into other families.  Yet, 
this use of their embryos would have been wrong even if they had not learned about 
it and experienced that emotional harm.  The reason has to do with the relationship 
between respect for persons and the special meaning reproduction can have for 
individuals. 
As argued above, freedom to make one’s own decisions about procreation is 
important in part because of the significant meanings procreation can have for 
persons.  Decisions about procreation have a bearing on concerns that are deep, 
personal, and that go to the core of self-identity.  Because of this, respect for persons 
requires that we permit individuals to make their own reproductive decisions.  To 
make those decisions for others without their concurrence, whether explicitly given 
to health professionals or inferred from sufficient evidence, is to treat them as mere 
means and not as ends in themselves.  These considerations apply to sperm removal 
and use after death or PVS; even if it does not cause adverse consequences to the 
man, use of his sperm for reproductive purposes without explicit or reasonably 
inferred consent would be disrespectful.  This is the main reason why a wife’s 
request for sperm retrieval should not be honored in such circumstances. 
E.  Objection:  Harm to Offspring 
A possible objection to the type of procreation being discussed is based on 
concern for the interests of the child who would be created.  This objection focuses 
on cases in which the offspring would be raised by one surviving parent.  Because no 
father would be involved in rearing the child, it might be claimed that bringing the 
child into being would be harmful to the child.  In reply, a serious problem with this 
objection has been pointed out.  Specifically, the objection overlooks the fact that the 
action that supposedly harms the child is the very action that brings the child into 
being.60  Because the objection fails to consider this, it misuses the concept of 
“harming”.  To see this, it is necessary to consider what it means to be harmed.  Here 
we can draw upon Joel Feinberg’s useful and thorough discussion of harming.  A key 
point is that persons are harmed by an action only if they are caused to be worse off 
than they would have been if the action had not been performed.61  The claim that 
                                                                
59See, e.g., Cynthia B. Cohen, Unmanaged Care:  The Need to Regulate New 
Reproductive Technologies in the United States, 11 BIOETHICS 348 (1997). 
60Carson Strong & Jay S. Schinfeld, The Single Woman and Artificial Insemination by 
Donor, 29 J. REPROD. MED. 293 (1984); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE:  
FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994); STRONG, supra note 53, at 85-
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61Joel Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, 4 SOC. PHIL. 
& POL’Y 145, 149-53 (1987); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31-64 (1984).  Feinberg 
points out that an unusual type of situation is possible, referred to as causal overdetermination.  
The possibility of this type of situation requires a modification to the necessary condition 
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creating children after the father dies or enters PVS harms the children who are 
brought into being, therefore, amounts to saying that the children are worse off than 
they would have been if they had not been created.  Clearly, there are problems with 
such a statement.  Some will say that it fails to make sense because it tries to 
compare nonexistence with something that exists.  Others will claim that it makes 
sense but is false.  The latter claim is based on the view that sometimes it can make 
sense to say that children are worse off than they would have been if they had not 
been created; namely, when life is so filled with pain and suffering that these 
negative experiences greatly overshadow any pleasurable or other positive 
experiences the children might have.  For example, if an infant were born with a 
painful, debilitating, and fatal genetic disease, it might be reasonable to make such a 
statement.  The view in question goes on to point out that the gap between such an 
infant and a child raised in a single parent household is exceedingly great.  Even if a 
child experienced some disadvantages in having only one living parent, that would 
not amount to a life filled with pain and suffering.  Thus, it can be argued that it is 
false that such children are harmed by being brought into existence.  Whether false 
or incoherent, the claim that the children in question are harmed by being brought 
into being should be rejected.62 
F.  Request by a Girlfriend 
Sometimes a request to retrieve the sperm of a single man is made by a girlfriend 
or fiancée.  It might be asked whether absence of a marital relationship makes it 
ethically unjustifiable to carry out the request.  It can be argued that the lack of 
marriage does not, in and of itself, make the retrieval unethical.  To see this, consider 
a case in which family members agree, based on previous conversations with the 
man about this matter, that he would want retrieval followed by insemination of the 
girlfriend.  In this situation, retrieval would promote the man’s freedom to make 
decisions about procreation after death or PVS.  Also, respect for the reproductive 
freedom of the girlfriend is a consideration.  The reasons given above for respecting 
a wife’s freedom to procreate would also apply to a girlfriend.  Because a number of 
the reasons for valuing procreative freedom apply to single as well as married 
people, there are grounds for respecting procreative freedom regardless of whether 
the persons are married. 
VI.  PROPOSED LEGAL APPROACHES TO CASES INVOLVING PATIENTS IN PERSISTENT 
VEGETATIVE STATE 
It was argued above that sperm retrieval from patients in PVS is ethically 
justifiable and should be permitted, in at least some cases.  One obstacle to 
permitting such retrieval is the absence of a legal basis for informed consent in this 
type of situation.  This section discusses various approaches that would make 
consent possible and permit retrieval legally to be performed in appropriate cases. 
One possible approach is to modify Living Will and DPAHC statutes.  States 
could modify their statutes so that they cover not only withholding of life-preserving 
                                                          
stated in the text, but that modification does not affect the analysis provided herein.  See 
Feinberg, Wrongful Life at 150-53. 
62Further discussion of this argument can be found in Carson Strong et al., Ethics of Sperm 
Retrieval after Death or Persistent Vegetative State, 15 HUM. REPROD. 739, 741-42 (2000). 
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treatment but also sperm removal and insemination.  Of course, many if not most 
patients who currently execute these documents are well beyond their reproductive 
years and would not use the documents to authorize sperm extraction.  However, if 
the documents and statutes giving them validity were modified, then younger 
persons could make use of them to secure their wishes concerning procreation in the 
event of PVS.  Those who execute such documents for sperm retrieval might also 
express their wishes concerning life-prolonging treatment, thus increasing the 
utilization of these documents for that purpose, as well.63 
A.  Common Law Basis for Consent 
Where states do not make such changes to Living Will and DPAHC statutes, the 
legal validity of consent could be based on the common law doctrine of advance 
directives.  The common law recognition of advance directives is based on the 
concept that persons should be allowed to exercise self-determination with regard to 
receiving or refusing medical procedures in the event of mental incompetence.  This 
                                                                
63For example, a new Living Will statute could be created by using the Uniform Rights of 
the Terminally Ill Act as a model, but making several modifications to it.  First, in section 1 
entitled “Definitions”, a definition of “irreversible unconsciousness” could be added.  The new 
definition could be stated as follows: 
“Irreversible unconsciousness” means an incurable condition in which, in the 
attending physician’s reasonable medical judgment, the patient lacks all consciousness 
and will not regain consciousness. 
Second, two new sections could be inserted after the current section 3, with renumbering of 
subsequent sections.  The new sections could be worded as follows: 
§ 4.  Declaration Relating to Sperm Retrieval 
A male of sound mind and 18 or more years of age may execute at any time a 
declaration governing the retrieval or nonretrieval of sperm for procreative purposes.  
The declaration must be signed by the declarant, or another at the declarant’s 
direction, and witnessed by two individuals. 
§ 5.  When Sperm Retrieval Declaration Operative 
A declaration concerning retrieval or nonretrieval of sperm becomes operative 
when (i) it is communicated to the attending physician and (ii) the declarant is 
determined by the attending physician to be in a condition of irreversible 
unconsciousness. 
Third, the title of the current section 3 should be modified to distinguish it from the new 
section 5.  The title could be changed to:  § 3.  When Life-Sustaining Treatment Declaration 
Operative. 
Other provisions of the current Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act would be 
applicable to the new sections without further changes in wording, including provisions for 
revoking a declaration. See UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 609 
(1987). 
Current DPAHC statutes could be made applicable to sperm retrieval by adding the 
following section: 
Declaration Relating to Sperm Retrieval 
The principal, if a male, may place in his durable power of attorney for health 
care document a statement authorizing his agent (attorney-in-fact) to consent or 
withhold consent to retrieval of sperm from the principal for procreative purposes.  
The principal may also include in the document instructions concerning disposition of 
the sperm once removed.  The inclusion of such statement and instructions in the 
document authorizes the attorney-in-fact to make decisions in accordance with such 
statement and instructions. 
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basic concept appears to apply to any medical procedure that involves a significant 
intrusion into the patient’s body.  Therefore, courts’ recognition of a right to consent 
to or refuse medical procedures provides a basis for extending the right to self-
determination to sperm retrieval and insemination.  Although court decisions to date 
have focused primarily on the right to refuse medical procedures, the underlying 
concept of self-determination also applies to consent to the performance of 
procedures.  Thus, extending common law advance directives to sperm retrieval 
would be consistent with previous court decisions.  Several types of common law 
advance directives for sperm removal would be possible:  Living Wills executed in 
states that lack Living Will statutes; Living Wills that address sperm retrieval 
executed in states having Living Will statutes that do not address sperm retrieval; 
and conversations between the patient and physician.  A conversation in which the 
patient tells the physician he would want sperm retrieval could be considered to 
constitute explicit prior consent.64 
The common law doctrine of substituted judgment could also be applied to sperm 
retrieval and insemination.  If there were sufficient evidence that the patient would, 
or would not, want sperm removal, then the next of kin could speak on behalf of the 
patient.  Although court decisions involving substituted judgment have mainly dealt 
with removal of life-preserving treatment, the underlying concept of patient self-
determination provides a basis for extending such surrogate decision making to 
sperm retrieval cases.  Evidence of the patient’s wishes could derive from Living 
Wills, DPAHC documents, or statements by family members concerning the 
patient’s wishes.  If the evidence presented to the physician consists primarily of 
statements made by the spouse or other family members, then it is necessary to 
consider whether such statements would constitute sufficient evidence to infer the 
patient’s wishes. 
In exploring what would count as sufficient evidence, let us consider a typical 
clinical scenario, in which there is absence of explicit prior consent but family 
members state that the man would have wanted the retrieval and there is no 
disagreement about this among the family.  A problem that arises is that the family 
members have a conflict of interest.  A surviving wife’s statement that her husband 
would have wanted his sperm extracted might be biased by her own interest in 
becoming pregnant.  Parents of the man, parents of the surviving wife, or other 
relatives could also be biased by their own interests or the interests of other family 
members.  Therefore, it can be argued, such statements do not constitute reliable 
evidence of the man’s wishes. 
One might seek a solution to this problem of bias by asking whether there are 
independent reasons for thinking that the man would agree to sperm extraction.  For 
example, is it reasonable to assert that a married man with no children would agree 
to his wife’s being inseminated with his sperm?  One could point out the strong 
desire to procreate of most married couples.  Specifically, it could be claimed that 
most married men want to beget children with their wives.  Many men want to have 
children who will carry on the family line after they die.  Furthermore, a man might 
                                                                
64If the legal authority of the patient to consent, by means of advance directives, to sperm 
retrieval and insemination after PVS becomes established in the future, then DPA statutes 
could be used to appoint an agent for the express purpose of consenting to such procedures.  
The concern that an agent cannot do what the principal is not authorized to do would have 
been overcome. 
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agree to retrieval if he knew (somehow) that his wife wanted it.  This reasoning is 
supported if we make the assumption, which seems plausible at least sometimes, that 
a married man would want to promote the interests of his surviving wife.  However, 
other considerations pull us toward the opposite conclusion.  Some men might not 
want to beget children in circumstances where they would be unable to take part in 
rearing.  If they cannot influence the child’s development, then they might not be 
interested in carrying on the family line.  Because of these conflicting possibilities, it 
is difficult to maintain that there are independent grounds for thinking that the man 
would consent.  If he had never discussed these matters with family or friends, then 
attempts to infer his wishes would be speculative. 
However, there is a type of situation in which there could be sufficient evidence 
to justify a conclusion that the patient would consent, despite the family’s conflict of 
interest and the absence of explicit prior consent.  If the patient had discussed sperm 
retrieval after PVS with his family and had stated that he would approve of it, then 
such statements could overcome the problem of family bias, in at least some cases.  
Here the evidence would consist of, not simply the family’s attempt to guess what 
the patient would want, but accounts of what he had actually said about sperm 
retrieval and insemination.  One can even imagine scenarios in which families 
present signed written statements made by the patient when competent, expressing a 
desire for sperm retrieval after onset of PVS.  Such documents could be useful to 
courts in deciding whether there is sufficient evidence of the patient’s wishes.  
Although cases to date have not involved patients who made such statements, verbal 
or written, future cases might involve such patients, given that the topic is being 
discussed more widely.   
In contrast, there might be cases in which family members give differing 
accounts of the patient’s previous statements and disagree over whether he would 
approve sperm extraction.  In such situations, if there are no written statements by 
the patient, one might conclude that there is not sufficient evidence that he would 
want the retrieval. 
The question will arise concerning what standard of evidence courts should use 
in determining the incompetent patient’s wishes.  With regard to determining the 
wishes of incompetent patients concerning life-preserving treatment, the Supreme 
Court has held that it is constitutional for states to have at least some degree of 
freedom in deciding the standard of evidence to be used.65  A similar argument 
would seem to apply to determining an incompetent patient’s wishes concerning 
sperm retrieval after onset of PVS; states should have at least some range of freedom 
in deciding the standard of evidence.  With regard to life-preserving treatment, 
several states have required the standard of clear and convincing evidence.  This 
standard has been held to be appropriate when the individual interests at stake are 
both particularly important and more substantial than mere loss of money.66  States 
that have used this standard have considered it suitable because of the importance of 
the state interest in preserving life.  It might similarly be claimed that the interest in 
avoiding unwanted procreation is sufficiently important to warrant a standard of 
clear and convincing evidence in determining whether a patient in PVS would want 
sperm retrieval. 
                                                                
65Specifically, the Court ruled that it is constitutional for Missouri to use the standard of 
clear and convincing evidence.  See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284. 
66Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982). 
1999-2000] SPERM RETRIEVAL 265 
Courts should regard the man’s consent, whether explicitly given or inferred 
from sufficient evidence, as a requirement for the legal removal of sperm and 
subsequent insemination. This legal approach is supported by the ethical argument, 
given above, that sperm should not be removed without the man’s explicit prior or 
reasonably inferred approval. 
B.  Constitutional Right to Privacy 
Should the constitutionally protected freedom to procreate extend to procreation 
after onset of PVS?  Based on considerations given above, it can be argued that it 
should.  It was shown that some of the reasons freedom to procreate in the ordinary 
context is important to persons also apply to procreation after PVS.  This provides a 
rationale for giving at least some degree of protection to freedom to procreate after 
onset of PVS.  However, we must consider the strength of protection that is 
warranted.  The constitutional right to privacy set forth in Griswold and subsequent 
Supreme Court cases involving procreation has been regarded by the Court as a 
fundamental right.  Thus, it is included among an especially important set of rights, 
described as being necessary for the “concept of ordered liberty”.67  As such, these 
rights deserve a standard of strict scrutiny, meaning that infringement of them is 
justified only if there is a compelling state interest and the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to meet that state interest.68  We need to consider whether strict scrutiny is 
appropriate for the right to procreate after onset of PVS.  As argued above, the 
interest in procreating after PVS is not as strong as the interest in procreating in the 
ordinary context.  For this reason, if a constitutional right to privacy were recognized 
in this area, it would be difficult to argue that it should be regarded as a fundamental 
right deserving strict scrutiny.  At best, a nonfundamental right to procreate after 
onset of PVS would be warranted, for which a rational basis test would be sufficient 
to justify interference.69 
The right to privacy of the surviving spouse is a different matter.  Procreation 
using her husband’s sperm would occur when she is alive and conscious.  As argued 
previously, her freedom to procreate in this situation should be regarded as 
comparable in importance to freedom to procreate in the ordinary scenario.  Freedom 
to choose the source of sperm for insemination is an aspect of her fundamental right 
to privacy.  As such, it calls for strict scrutiny.  Thus, we reach an interesting 
conclusion:  when the man in PVS would want sperm retrieval and insemination of 
his wife, and the wife wants these procedures to be performed, state interference 
requires strict scrutiny, despite the man’s lack of a fundamental right, because the 
wife’s right to privacy is a fundamental right. 
This does not mean, however, that she is legally entitled to have sperm removed 
in the absence of  sufficient evidence that the man would want this done.  It was 
argued above that it is wrong to use persons’ gametes for procreative purposes 
without their consent.  The man’s explicit prior consent, or sufficient evidence that 
he would approve, would be necessary. 
                                                                
67See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. 319, 325, 328 (1937); Notes, On Privacy:  Constitutional Protection for Personal 
Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670, 681 (1973). 
68Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). 
69See Robertson, supra note 57, at 1040-1042. 
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Another issue is whether the constitutionally protected interest in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment extends to refusal of sperm retrieval.  This issue would 
arise in situations in which there is sufficient evidence that the man would not want 
sperm extraction to be performed, although the spouse or other next of kin is 
requesting the procedure.  It seems reasonable to conclude that, just as a man has a 
right to refuse medical treatment, he should be considered to have a right to refuse 
sperm removal.  It might be objected that sperm retrieval is not “treatment”, and 
therefore the right to refuse treatment does not apply, strictly speaking.  However, 
the right to refuse treatment is based on a more general right to bodily self-
determination, which is broad enough to encompass a right to refuse sperm 
retrieval.70 
If there is a right to refuse sperm retrieval based on the constitutional right to 
refuse medical treatment, the strength of these rights remains an open question.  In 
Cruzan, although the Supreme Court recognized that a competent person has a 
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical 
treatment, it held that this “does not mean that an incompetent person should possess 
the same right,” since such a person is unable to make a voluntary and informed 
choice to exercise that right.71  Moreover, the Court refrained from stating that the 
incompetent person’s right to refuse treatment is fundamental.  On the other hand, in 
their dissent Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun argued that the incompetent 
patient’s right to refuse medical treatment is fundamental.72  How the Supreme Court 
will eventually decide this issue remains to be seen.  If the view of Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun prevails in the future, then one could argue that the right to 
refuse sperm retrieval that derives from the constitutional right to refuse medical 
procedures is a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny.  In that event, one could 
argue that a constitutional right to refuse sperm retrieval is derivable from two 
sources—a fundamental right to refuse treatment and a nonfundamental right to 
avoid procreation.  In that situation, the right to refuse sperm retrieval, in effect, 
would be fundamental. 
VII.  PROPOSED LEGAL APPROACHES TO CASES INVOLVING DEAD PATIENTS 
If postmortem sperm retrieval and insemination should sometimes be permitted, 
then there is a need to establish the legal validity of consent to such retrieval and 
insemination.  Because the law concerning disposition of dead bodies differs from 
the law concerning treatment of incompetent patients, changes in the law that are 
needed to make consent possible are different in these two types of scenarios. 
Common law has not required that the disposition of dead bodies be in 
accordance with the wishes of the deceased, assuming those wishes are known, nor 
has it generally recognized the decedent’s wishes as constituting consent which 
would authorize medical procedures to be performed on the cadaver.  Thus, it 
appears that there is no clear precedent in common law that can be used to create in 
the decedent’s wishes a power to authorize sperm retrieval.  Moreover, the next of 
kin’s right is limited to decisions about burial or cremation; any other right of the 
                                                                
70Schloendorff, 105 N.E. 92. 
71Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 262, 279-80 (emphasis added). 
72Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 301-330. 
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next of kin to make decisions about the cadaver must be conferred by statute.  These 
considerations suggest that changes in the common law to authorize consent for 
postmortem sperm retrieval are not forthcoming.  Changes to authorize such consent 
would have to be statutory. 
As discussed above, the UAGA is not applicable to postmortem sperm retrieval 
for procreative purposes.  One approach to legal change would involve states 
enacting legislation stating that a man’s explicit prior consent to postmortem sperm 
retrieval and insemination constitutes legally valid consent.  Such statutes should 
also empower the next of kin to consent on behalf of the patient to sperm retrieval 
and insemination, provided there is sufficient evidence the deceased would have 
wanted such procedures to be performed.  Statutes should require that sperm retrieval 
from dead patients not occur unless the patient had given explicit prior consent or 
there is sufficient evidence to conclude that he would approve.  Given the next of 
kin’s potential conflict of interest, such evidence should be based on conversations or 
written statements by the deceased expressing a desire for such procedures.  States 
should have a certain degree of freedom in deciding the standard of evidence to be 
used.  A standard of clear and convincing evidence would be reasonable, given the 
importance of freedom to avoid unwanted procreation.73 
Although there is no basis in common law for authorizing postmortem sperm 
retrieval, at least one case has dealt with postmortem insemination.  The Hecht74 
decision recognized the interest of gamete providers to decide the disposition of their 
gametes following death, and other courts should follow Hecht in this regard.  Courts 
should recognize explicit prior consent as constituting legally valid consent to 
insemination.  To be valid, such consent would have to address the question of 
                                                                
73Such a statute might have the following form: 
Consent to Postmortem Sperm Retrieval Act 
§ 1.  Explicit Prior Consent 
A male of sound mind and 18 or more years of age may give explicit consent to 
a physician for postmortem retrieval of his sperm and use of such sperm for artificial 
insemination of a woman designated by the sperm donor.  Such consent, if 
documented in the sperm donor’s medical record, shall constitute legally valid 
consent. 
§ 2.  Declaration of Intent, and Consent by Next of Kin 
A male of sound mind and 18 or more years of age may execute a declaration 
governing the postmortem retrieval or nonretrieval of his sperm for procreative 
purposes and, in the event of retrieval, the use of such sperm for artificial 
insemination.  The declaration must be signed by the declarant, or another at the 
declarant’s direction, and witnessed by two individuals.  After the declarant’s death, 
the next of kin shall be authorized to consent to or refuse sperm retrieval and 
insemination on behalf of the declarant, provided such consent or refusal is in 
accordance with the declaration. 
§ 3.  Explicit or Inferred Consent Required 
Postmortem sperm retrieval for procreative purposes, and subsequent artificial 
insemination, shall not be performed unless the decedent had given explicit prior 
consent in accordance with section 1 or there is clear and convincing evidence he 
would have approved the performance of these procedures.  Clear and convincing 
evidence would include, but is not necessarily limited to, a declaration made in 
accordance with section 2. 
74Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (1993). 
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whom the man wishes to be inseminated.  Use of his sperm to inseminate someone 
other than the person he specified would violate his freedom not to procreate.75  
Courts also should recognize the next of kin, or other legally authorized 
representative, as having the ability to consent to postmortem insemination on behalf 
of the decedent, provided there is sufficient evidence the decedent would have 
wanted the insemination to take place.  Given the potential conflict of interest, such 
evidence should be based on conversations or written statements by the deceased 
expressing a desire for such insemination.  Courts should not permit postmortem 
insemination unless the decedent gave explicit prior consent or there is sufficient 
evidence he would have wanted the insemination to occur. 
It can be argued that the constitutionally protected freedom to procreate should 
apply to postmortem procreation.  Some of the reasons freedom to procreate in the 
ordinary scenario is important to persons also apply to postmortem procreation.  This 
provides a basis for giving at least some degree of protection to freedom to have 
one’s gametes used for procreative purposes after death.  Thus, a legal justification 
for honoring a man’s request for postmortem sperm retrieval and insemination could 
rest on the constitutional right to privacy.  As in the case of freedom to procreate 
after onset of PVS, it is difficult to argue that freedom to have one’s gametes (or 
embryos) used for procreation after death is a fundamental right requiring strict 
scrutiny.  Rather, a rational basis test would appear sufficient to justify state 
interference with such freedom.  In cases where the deceased had wanted sperm 
retrieval and insemination of his wife, and the wife wants these procedures 
performed, state interference would require the test of strict scrutiny because her 
right to privacy should be regarded as fundamental. 
Also, the constitutionally protected freedom not to procreate should be 
interpreted as including freedom to refuse postmortem sperm retrieval and 
subsequent insemination. Some of the reasons freedom not to procreate in the 
ordinary scenario is important to persons also apply to procreation after death.  As 
argued earlier, the ethical principle of respect for persons requires that sperm not be 
removed contrary to the man’s wishes. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Currently no statutes in the U.S. authorize the patient or next of kin to consent to 
sperm retrieval or insemination after death or onset of PVS.  Also, there is no basis 
in common law for the next of kin to consent to postmortem sperm retrieval and 
insemination. The question of whether consent in PVS cases can be based on the 
common law of advance directives or the common law authority of the next of kin 
has not been adjudicated by any court.  Similarly, no court has ruled on the question 
of whether a patient may consent in advance to postmortem sperm retrieval.  
Moreover, the issue of whether the constitutional right to privacy should be extended 
to the area of sperm retrieval and insemination after death or PVS has not been 
adjudicated.  On the other hand, there is no current legal requirement to have the 
                                                                
75It is possible that an inferred approval of the choice of recipient could be based on the 
man’s previous selection of a person to make that decision for him, as in a Durable Power of 
Attorney.  For example, a single man might appoint a family member to make decisions for 
him concerning sperm removal and insemination after death, including decisions about 
selection of a procreative partner. 
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patient’s explicit prior or reasonably inferred consent to sperm retrieval and 
insemination after death or PVS. 
It has been argued in this paper that sperm retrieval and insemination after death 
or onset of PVS should be permitted, provided the man has given explicit prior 
consent or there is sufficient evidence to conclude he would approve of such 
procedures.  If this argument is correct, then the law should provide a way for 
consent to be given in such cases.  There are several ways this could be done:  by 
passing legislation that explicitly addresses these areas; by extending the common 
law doctrines of advance directives and substituted judgment to cases involving 
PVS; and by extending constitutionally-based freedoms to procreate (or not 
procreate) and to refuse medical procedures to cases involving PVS or death.  It has 
also been argued in this paper that sperm retrieval and insemination should not occur 
unless the man has given explicit prior consent or there is sufficient evidence to 
conclude that he would agree to these procedures being performed. 
